The quiet acts of diplomacy

The AP reports there were extensive diplomatic efforts between the US and Iran in the lead up to Saturday’s 6-month deal signed in Geneva:

The United States and Iran secretly engaged in a series of high-level, face-to-face talks over the past year, in a high-stakes diplomatic gamble by the Obama administration that paved the way for the historic deal sealed early Sunday in Geneva aimed at slowing Tehran’s nuclear program.

This type of effort can only be seen as a “gamble” if the frame of reference is a Hawkish worldview of pre-emptive war, popularised by Rumsfeld & Co. under Bush II. This wasn’t a “gamble” in any sense, however, but rather a return to tough diplomatic efforts like Nixon pursued with China.

The AP reports of serious efforts to keep these multi-year (for a timeline, see NPR’s latest) talks that preceded the headline making talks in Geneva clandestine and out-of-view of both the mainstream media and US allies:

Hoping to keep the [diplomatic] channel open, Secretary of State John Kerry then visited Oman in May on a trip ostensibly to push a military deal with the sultanate but secretly focused on maintaining that country’s key mediation role, particularly after the Iranian election scheduled for the next month, the officials said.

[…]

It was only after that Obama-Rouhani phone call [in late September] that the U.S. began informing allies of the secret talks with Iran, the U.S. officials said.

Lower-level officials were at the heart of much of the diplomacy and met with Iranian counterparts in multiple locations, which Obama administration officials want to keep secret for possible future diplomatic efforts. Some of the administration’s low-level negotiators were out of sight through the very public talks in Geneva in November:

At this month’s larger formal nuclear negotiations between world powers and Iran in Geneva, Burns and Sullivan showed up as well, but the State Department went to great lengths to conceal their involvement, leaving their names off of the official delegation list.

They were housed at a different hotel than the rest of the team, used back entrances to come and go from meeting venues and were whisked into negotiating sessions from service elevators or unused corridors only after photographers left.

This secrecy was certainly a reason for France’s tough stance in early November:

In the end, though, it was not only divisions between Iran and the major powers that prevented a deal, but fissures within the negotiating group. France objected strenuously that the proposed deal would do too little to curb Iran’s uranium enrichment or to stop the development of a nuclear reactor capable of producing plutonium.

And Israel’s even tougher stance at the UN general assembly meeting where Netanyahu called Rouhani a “sheep in wolf’s clothing”:

In the end, Obama did exactly what he said he would do since the 2008 presidential campaign, despite the criticism he received from liberal politicians like Hilary Clinton who did not want to engage with “rouge” leaders:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1dSPrb5w_k

I can only hope that these latest talks between Iran and the US change the framework for understanding international relations and the use of diplomacy within the mainstream American polity. It isn’t a “gamble” to speak with other countries unless the standard operating procedure is animosity, mistrust, and suspicion of all other countries. It would be a welcome change if, at the very least, liberal politicians use a new language to speak of diplomacy in the future. Even further, I hope a new normal emerges within the institutions of US foreign policy because of these latest efforts to speak with Iran. In the next six months, we’ll see if Obama’s foreign policy legacy takes shape or falters like the roll-out of his domestic legacy, healthcare.org.