Japan responds to China in the Mekong

At the 7th Mekong-Japan Summit held in Tokyo yesterday, Japan announced a new aid package and strategy for cooperation that was seen as a counter-balance to China’s growing role in the region, which includes bilateral aid to most Mekong states as well as the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

As the Bangkok Post reports:

Japan hopes to distinguish its aid packages on infrastructure development in the Mekong region from that of China by promoting advanced Japanese technology, environment-friendly know-how and capacity-building schemes, the officials said.

In their summit in April 2012, Japan pledged to provide about 600 billion yen in official development assistance to five Mekong countries over the next three years to boost the region’s development.

The new strategy is in line with Abe’s investment initiative announced in May to provide US$110 billion promote “quality infrastructure” in Asia over the next five years.

China balances financial capitalism with state communism

As the stock markets in China continue to decline, the Securities Association of China, the largest government-backed brokerage firm, offered rhetoric that blends ideas of the free market with a common struggle for development:

Excessively rapid rises and falls in the stock market are not conducive to the stable and healthy development of the market…and as major players in this market, securities companies must take the initiative to shoulder responsibility, to unify as one, merge our wills and safeguard market stability with all our strength.

The real tragedy, as the New York Times reports, falls on the individuals who, taking up the common struggle for financial capitalism (i.e., people listened to the state-run media that encouraged people to buy more stocks), saw their savings vanish:

Share prices have fallen nearly a third since June 12, erasing more than $2 trillion of value and inflicting immediate hardship on millions of families who not only invested their savings but also borrowed heavily at steep interest rates to buy more shares.

For more on the wild-West (or East) of financial capitalism, read these 10 facts about the Chinese stock market.

The Cambodia position in the South China Sea dispute

Veasna Var states the challenges Cambodia faces in the South China Sea dispute and then provides foreign policy recommendations:

Maintaining the status quo would be a desirable option for Cambodia. The country is likely to remain under pressure from both Vietnam and China for the foreseeable future. It cannot afford to abandon Vietnam as its neighbor, the Philippines as its Asean co-member or the US. But nor can Cambodia afford to risk its economic partnership with China.

To best serve its national development interests Cambodian foreign policy should emphasis its strict adherence to its neutrality, non-alliance and peaceful co-existence approaches as spelled out in the Cambodian constitution. This neutrality provides the best option for Cambodia to effectively deal with complex regional and international situations.

It also aligns with Cambodia’s ‘Rectangular Strategy’, which spells out the importance and necessity of integrating Cambodia into the international community.

Keeping all sides in the South China Sea happy is truly challenging for Cambodia’s foreign policy and requires an extraordinary degree of diplomacy. Cambodia could play a diplomatic role in keeping itself informed and warning others not to let differences spill over to the use or threat of force.

Cambodia could propose a mechanism that allows Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines to take the lead in negotiations. At the same time, Cambodia should support, or at least not obstruct, consensus in Asean.

Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar agree on more cooperation

The meeting in Myanmar’s capital, Nay Pyi Taw, saw the four heads of state issue a join statement that promotes trade and investment, transport, agriculture, tourism and development of human resources. I’d be interested to learn more about what human resources are in need of development and how the countries plan to develop them.

The Bangkok Post reports:

In a joint statement, the four leaders called for deeper coordination to make best use of economic corridors, facilitate cross-border movement of goods and passengers, and facilitate air transport through bilateral and multilateral agreements on air services.

They also agreed to mutually facilitate investments in agriculture, industry, energy, technology and telecommunications sectors, through incentives in important areas including SME development, renewable energy, and mineral exploitation.

Myanmar President Thein Sein, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and Lao Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong also expressed gratitude to the Japanese government and other development partners for the support rendered to their countries under Mekong cooperation frameworks.

Don Sahong Dam and the business of regional cooperation

The Don Sahong Dam is located on the Mekong River in southern Laos, close to the Cambodian border. The lead company building the dam is Malaysia-based MegaFirst Corporation Berhad. MegaFirst is in discussions with China’s Sinohydro International Corporation, which has at least 122 international hydroelectric projects underway, over contracts to build the dam. The Mekong River Commission, an intergovernmental body made up of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand and charged with coordinating sustainable development across the Mekong River basin, has been stuck in its discussions over the proposed dam. Laos now wants to go ahead with the project without the Mekong River Commission’s input.

The negative human and environmental impact this dam will have in Laos and Cambodia makes it controversial. Add into the mix the business interests of Malaysia and China and the dam is a full-fledged regional powder-keg waiting to explode. The question is whether regional cooperation can resolve this issue or will Laos move forward unilaterally.

The regional geopolitics of crafting a national identity in Myanmar


A new Startfor Global Intelligence analysis makes sense of the current discriminatory polices in Myanmar:

Myanmar’s current constitution does not make Buddhism the state religion, but it recognizes the “special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union.” It also bars monks from holding political office. As the recent run of political successes by the nationalist movement has shown, the central government has become increasingly open to giving in to the Buddhists’ demands.

To Naypyidaw, such concessions may be worthwhile. Many of the nation’s minority ethnic groups continue to support ongoing insurgencies, but these rebel groups depend on anti-government and anti-Bamar sentiment. Redirecting hostility toward Muslims unifies the country’s key ethnic groups along with Myanmar’s central core and the key upland region of Shan state. Moreover, Myanmar’s economy remains largely reliant on Chinese investment. Anti-Chinese communal riots broke out in 1967, pushing many Chinese out of the country. Naypyidaw does not want this to happen again. Resentment of Muslims as a foreign element may help displace resentment of the Chinese.

Putting Buddhism at the root of national identity comes at a cost for the government, as shown by the involvement of Buddhist monks in the 1988 anti-government protests and, especially, the 2007 “Saffron Revolution.” The Rohingya issue has also strained Naypyidaw’s relations with several Southeast Asian states, particularly Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, as thousands of Rohingya refugees continue to show up on their shores. Sectarian tension also heightens the risk of sparking an Islamist militant backlash. Nonetheless, as Myanmar continues consolidating as a nation, Buddhist nationalism will remain a force to reckon with in national politics. For now, the central government will continue to bend to Buddhist nationalist pressure, and the movement will be a powerful tool for key political figures. In time, however, the populist upsurge — and the Sangha itself — could come back to haunt the central government.

General discourse on Cambodia’s readiness for the AEC

An opinion piece in the Khmer Times captures the general discourse on Cambodia’s low quality education (especially technical education) as the main reason impeding successful integration in the Asean Economic Community:

It is late, but not too late, for Cambodia to pay increased attention and priority to education, courses, training, vocational schools and universities. In this process, it must pay attention to competency standards, at least to Asean levels. This way all educational curricula in Asean would meet standards and be recognized at the international level.

Washington’s aim in Cambodia is still democracy

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives  held a subcommittee hearing entitled “Retreat or revival: A status report on democracy in Asia,” which brought together American experts on Asia.  The Honorable Tom Malinowski, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, said:

In Cambodia, promoting democratic governance and human rights continues to be our top priority. U.S. and international pressure contributed to the Cambodian government allowing the Cambodian opposition and its leadership more freedom to participate in the July 2013 parliamentary election. While the 2013 election was the most peaceful in Cambodia’s history and produced a large increase in opposition seats, there were procedural irregularities and allegations of fraud and flawed voter registration. The opposition boycotted parliament while demanding electoral reforms and investigations into the irregularities.
Throughout the year-long political standoff that ensued, the U.S.government, especially through our Embassy in Phnom Penh, advocated tirelessly and effectively for nonviolence and direct dialogue between the Cambodian government and the opposition. These efforts were diplomacy at its best, with the U.S. government serving as a critical interlocutor and bridge, while consistently advocating democratic principles both privately and publicly in Phnom Penh and from Washington.

More Chinese investment does not mean more Chinese cultural influence

A new article in Voice of America says Cambodian students still prefer learning English over Chinese, despite the increased influence (economic and strategic) Beijing has over Phnom Penh:

Cambodia’s government, for its part, has been outwardly supportive of China, especially on the controversial issue of disputed maritime claims in the South China Sea.

Phnom Penh has consistently backed Beijing’s desire for bilateral-only negotiations despite calls from Southeast Asian neighbors, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, for a multi-lateral solution to the problem.

But these growing economic and political bonds do not necessarily lead to stronger cultural ties.

Chheang Vannarith, a professor at Leeds University in Britain, said despite China’s stronger engagement with Cambodia, its cultural influence is not growing because Beijing is putting much more emphasis on military and infrastructure assistance.

He says China should do more to support social services and civil society.

“This is a lack of support in China to Cambodia, “said Vannarith. “China has no policies to support the civil society, but [does have policies for] assistances from government to government and business to business. China should reconsider that issue in order to improve its image.”